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The Supreme Court provided a new consideration to the longstanding debate about public
aid to parochial schools in its June 2020 decision of Espinoza v. Montana Department of
Revenue. In Espinoza, the Supreme Court injected demands of the Free Exercise Clause into a
debate historically governed by Establishment Clause concerns. The Court did this by relying on
precedent in Trinity Lutheran v. Comer (2017), which says that the Free Exercise Clause protects
against laws that impose religious status discrimination unless those laws pass strict scrutiny.
Applying this precedent to Espinoza, the Court held that the application of Montana’s
constitutional provision preventing public aid from arriving at parochial schools was a form of
religious status discrimination that did not pass strict scrutiny; therefore, it was unconstitutional.
But while that finding may affect the future of state constitutional no-aid provisions known as
Blaine Amendments, it is by itself insufficient to determine in what situations public aid is
constitutional.
When governments or courts determine whether it is constitutional for religious schools
to receive public funding, they must consider together the demands of both the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses, recognizing “‘there is room for play in the joints’ between them.” 1
Analysis must not be limited to free exercise protection against religious status discrimination, as
it was in Espinoza; it must also include Establishment Clause considerations, specifically the
doctrines of neutrality and private choice. When applied to questions about public aid to
parochial schools, these doctrines yield different answers for programs of direct and indirect
funding.
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Background on Espinoza and Blaine Amendments
Some brief background on Espinoza may be helpful for understanding its implications.
The case is about a program established by the Montana Legislature that provided tax credits to
those who donated to private school scholarship organizations. Families of students awarded
scholarships from such organizations could decide to which private schools they would apply the
funds. In implementing the program, the Montana Department of Revenue promulgated a rule
prohibiting families from applying scholarships to religious schools. It did so in an attempt to
comply with the Montana Constitution’s provision prohibiting either indirect or direct aid to
religious schools.
The Montana Constitution’s no-aid provision is known as a Blaine Amendment, and
Montana is one of thirty-seven states to have such a provision in its constitution.2 Blaine
Amendments are so named for a failed federal constitutional amendment barring aid to sectarian
schools that was introduced in 1875 by House Speaker James Blaine. When the federal
amendment failed, many states adopted their own versions—sometimes as a coerced condition of
admission to the Union. Despite their prevalence in state constitutions, Blaine Amendments are
highly controversial for two main reasons: Anti-Catholic animus fueled the original Blaine
Amendment, and Blaine Amendments demand a very strict separation of church and state that
some deem unnecessary or even unconstitutional.
The question the Court ruled on in Espinoza was the application of Montana’s Blaine
Amendment. The Court has never ruled directly on the constitutionality of a Blaine Amendment
itself, but in Espinoza, it came close. The majority took several occasions in its opinion to attack
Montana’s no-aid provision, writing that it “bars religious schools from public benefits solely
2
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because of the religious character of the schools. …This is apparent from the plain text,” and
also, matter-of-factly, that “The Montana Constitution discriminates based on religious status.”
Further, the Court’s holding that Montana should not have applied its no-aid provision to the very
circumstance in which it seemed to be relevant suggests no-aid provisions themselves are
constitutionally questionable, and at a minimum out of favor with the Court.
As a result, Blaine Amendments stand on tenuous ground. Even if it is constitutional to
retain Blaine Amendments in state constitutions, could it ever be constitutional to apply them? It
seems unlikely given that the textual construction of Blaine Amendments usually consists of a
distinction made solely on whether or not an entity is religious—a distinction the Court would
call status-based discrimination. Thus, when states with Blaine Amendments attempt to comply
with Espinoza, they will recognize they cannot deny religious schools or those who attend them
the opportunity to apply for public aid simply because they are religious. But they will still be
left with the question of whether or not it is permissible to actually grant aid. Here they must turn
to the Establishment Clause for guidance.
Judicial Interpretation of the Establishment Clause
The Establishment Clause is the companion to the Free Exercise Clause in establishing
constitutional protection of religious freedom. The Establishment Clause stipulates that
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.” This prohibition also
applies to state legislatures through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Unfortunately, interpretation of the Establishment Clause is notoriously complicated, making
its application sometimes difficult to discern. Although the Establishment Clause is vital in
maintaining a proper relationship between church and state, neither its historical, scholarly, or
judicial interpretations are entirely consistent in articulating what constitutes establishment.

Despite differences in interpretation, most justices past and present have focused to some extent
on questions of a policy’s intent, neutrality in implementation, and resulting relationship between
church and state.
These concerns underlie the landmark decision of Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971), which said
providing public salary supplements to parochial school teachers was unconstitutional.3 In
Lemon, the Court built upon tests in Walz v. Tax Commission (1971) and Everson v. Board of
Education (1947) to create a three-prong test to determine if an Establishment Clause violation
has occurred.4 The test asks whether a governmental action or policy:
1. Has a clear secular purpose
2. Has a primary effect of promoting or inhibiting religion
3. Results in excessive government entanglement with religion
To pass all three prongs, a governmental action or policy must have a clear secular purpose,
must not have a primary effect of promoting or inhibiting religion, and must not result in
excessive government entanglement with religion. For the first two decades of its application, the
Lemon test resulted in a strict separation of church and state in parochial aid cases, but
conservative justices later shifted the ambiguous test’s analysis to be more accommodating of
religious options.5
The Lemon test has been widely criticized for its prongs’ ambiguity, which has resulted in
inconsistent applications and outcomes. In many cases where it could have been applied, Lemon
has been ignored. When the Court applied Lemon again in 1993 after evading it in other cases,
3
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Justice Antonin Scalia famously wrote that “Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that
repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried,
Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again.”6 It has continued to “stalk” on
and off since.
The Court modified the Lemon test in Agostini v. Felton (1997) by integrating prong
three, the excessive entanglement prong, into prong two, the primary effect prong. The
modification of the test helped to shift the Court’s hardline policy of strict separation of church
and state, which was typically invoked by prong three, to focus more on whether the primary
effect of the policy was neutral toward religion.7
But even with modification, the Lemon test has still been widely criticized. The criticism
stems more likely from the difficulty of applying the Lemon test than a total error in the test’s
considerations. Even when Lemon is not used, the notions underlying its prongs, such as policy
purpose and neutrality of policy, tend to resurface in arguments about Establishment Clause
violations.
While Lemon remains on the books, it is unclear exactly if or how it might be applied in
future cases as a controlling precedent. The Court sharply criticized the test in its 2019 decision
of American Legion v. American Humanist Association, but it proposed no new test.8
If Lemon is out, as some justices have indicated, then it is necessary to turn to the Court’s
principle-based antiestablishment approaches. Interestingly, the principles of these approaches
often underlie many of the same concerns of the Lemon test. This is evident in Justice Stephen
6
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Breyer’s dissent in Espinoza in which he raised the establishment concerns of the government’s
purpose—the first prong of the Lemon test—and effect of its policy—the second prong. However,
instead of mentioning Lemon, he mentioned the Court’s neutrality doctrine.9 Neutrality and its
related principles of avoiding coercion and endorsement are among some of the principle-based
approaches the Court has used in antiestablishment jurisprudence instead of the Lemon test.
As this limited recitation of jurisprudence has shown, it is unclear exactly what the
Establishment Clause demands. But out of the complexity of Establishment Clause jurisprudence
some guiding principles have emerged, including the importance of neutrality in intent, effect,
and sometimes implementation of governmental policies. Because Lemon is out of favor with the
Court, I will discuss how two Establishment Clause doctrines—neutrality and private
choice—can effectively guide determinations about public aid to religious schools.
The Establishment Clause Doctrine of Neutrality
The doctrine of neutrality has a long-established history in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. It first emerged in Everson v. Board of Education (1947) in which the Supreme
Court upheld a New Jersey law that allowed public reimbursement of the cost of transportation to
schools, including private religious schools.10 In so holding, the Everson Court said that the
Establishment Clause precludes the government from “prefer[ring] one religion over another”
and also that it “requires the state to be neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers
and nonbelievers.”11 The Everson Court also made clear that neutrality prohibits the government
from being an “adversary” of religion, meaning that “State power is no more to be used so as to
9
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handicap religions than it is to favor them.”12 The New Jersey program was neutral toward
religion, the Court held, because it included both nonreligious and religious private schools.
The Everson Court’s characterization of neutrality supports the notion that government
policies must have a secular purpose. This prevents the government from implementing policies
that would favor religion in a general sense or certain religions in particular—policies tantamount
to endorsing religion. In addition, the doctrine of neutrality articulated in Everson would
preclude public aid from being used to coerce or endorse religious belief or behavior, or from
being used to skew the marketplace of choice toward or away from religious options.
Private Choice Doctrine
The Court’s private choice doctrine was born out of its neutrality doctrine. Private choice
doctrine maintains that the government has remained neutral when it directs aid or benefits to a
broad class of individual recipients who, by their private choices, then direct the aid to religious
schools.
The private choice doctrine was first emphasized in Mueller v. Allen (1983). In that case,
the Court dismissed an Establishment Clause challenge to an educational expense tax deduction
program that included parochial schools. The Court held that the program was constitutional
because the program did “not have the primary effect of advancing the sectarian aims of
nonpublic schools;” rather, the program “provide[d] aid to parochial schools only as a result of
decisions of individual parents.”13 Private choice doctrine gained traction in several decisions
after Mueller, and it took on significant power in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2002). Unlike
previous cases of private choice, which typically involved minimal government aid of inherently
12
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secular materials or activities, Zelman upheld a private choice tuition voucher program that
allowed individuals to apply their vouchers directly to religiously affiliated schools for religiously
integrated education. The Zelman Court held that this was constitutional because the program
was enacted for a secular purpose—providing education; the program provided assistance “to a
broad class of citizen;” “true private choice” existed; and the state did not create incentives that
would skew choices toward religious schools.
The private choice doctrine represents a shift from stricter no-aid holdings of the Court
before Mueller.14 However, it is now well entrenched in jurisprudence and appears here to stay.
Even though the Court declined to address any Establishment Clause concerns in Espinoza, it
took the time to hint its support for the private choice doctrine articulated in Zelman, writing that
“Any Establishment Clause objection…here is particularly unavailing because the government
support makes its way to religious schools only as a result of Montanans independently choosing
to spend their scholarships at such schools.”15 As a result, private choice doctrine, along with its
parent doctrine of neutrality, should be considered in determining the Establishment Clause’s
implications regarding the constitutionality of public aid reaching religious schools.
The Permissibility of Direct Aid
Because the Supreme Court has made distinctions between direct and indirect aid, as
have many no-aid constitutional provisions, I will consider direct and indirect aid separately,
beginning with direct aid. Here, direct aid means the transferring of public aid from a
governmental body directly to a religiously affiliated school. Determining how neutrality affects
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direct aid requires consideration of the purpose of the aid, whether the aid or its implemented
purposes may result in coercion or endorsement, and whether the marketplace of choice resulting
from the direct aid is neutral toward religion.
I. The purpose of the aid must be secular
The government’s intention in providing direct aid is a first consideration. The aid’s
purpose should be secular to prevent concerns of government endorsement of one religion or
religion generally. For example, suppose a state legislature allocates funds for which private and
public secondary schools can apply to purchase math textbooks containing the state’s newly
updated curriculum standards. The purpose here is secular, and the standard of neutrality is met
because the purpose of the funding is neither to advance or inhibit religion. The state, of course,
can set forth requirements to apply, such as requiring schools to demonstrate financial need or
meet accreditation standards. However, as long as parochial schools meet the requirements set
forth by the state, which cannot be based on religious status,16 they should be eligible to apply
and ostensibly receive the benefits from the state to fulfill the state’s secular purpose.
Some may be concerned that math textbooks awarded to religious schools could be used
in religiously integrated curriculums and thus have the effect of advancing religion. It is true that
parochial schools may incorporate religious elements into their teaching of math. However, as
long as the state’s secular purpose in providing textbooks—to help students learn the state’s
curriculum standards—will still be accomplished, the state’s purpose in providing textbooks has
been fulfilled. Ancillary curriculum or pedagogical techniques that incorporate religion need not
concern the state.
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II. The direct aid cannot result in coercion or endorsement
A second neutrality concern that must be considered is whether the aid or implementation
of the aid would coerce individuals to perform or pretend religious beliefs or acts in order to
obtain a benefit, or if providing the aid would result in endorsement of one religion or religion
generally. Whether or not coercion or endorsement may exist determines whether or not
neutrality in implementation of public aid is required. Two examples may help to illustrate.
First, suppose the government decides to create a law that allows selected schools to
establish after-school remedial math programs that serve their local communities. The remedial
math programs would be open to any students in the community, not just students who attend the
schools in which the programs are held. Suppose also that the government only has funds to
award two schools in a large and religiously diverse community this privilege, and it decides to
fund the two schools that seem to be most geographically convenient for students in the
community. In choosing the two schools, the government’s assumption is that students will
attend the after-school program nearest to them.
If one of the schools chosen is a religious school, then the religious school would
probably need to be religiously neutral in implementing the after-school program to avoid the
possibility of coercion. This is because students would likely be deciding which school’s
program to attend based on geographic proximity, not based on the religious nature of the school
holding the program. The lack of convenient alternatives to a religious option inhibits a fair
choice about which program to attend. As a result, incorporating religious elements to the
administration of the math program could result in participants being coerced to hold, assume, or
pretend religious beliefs or acts simply to participate in the program nearest to them.

Even if, somehow, no student attending the remedial math program at a religious school
would be coerced into religious beliefs or behavior if the curriculum was religiously integrated,
the funding of one particular religious school—and the authorization for the school to implement
religious elements—could raise an establishment concern. Some might consider the state to be
showing a preference for a particular religion by choosing to aid that religion’s school and not
others. Therefore, it would probably be best for the school to be religiously neutral in
implementing the program.
Consider a second example where the state establishes the same program, but this time
the state can fund all accredited schools to hold their own after-school remedial math programs
for their own students. In this case, integration of religion by religious schools to their
after-school math programs would not be likely to result in coercion. Students at religious
schools have already opted in to religiously integrated instruction by choosing to attend a
religious school; therefore, a religiously integrated curriculum would not likely result in coercion
of religious beliefs or behavior.
In addition, this scenario, where all schools receive direct aid, prevents the government
from preferring one religion to another in its distribution of benefits, thereby alleviating concerns
of government endorsement of religion. Thus, when coercion and endorsement concerns are
mitigated through the structuring of government policy, a religious school need not be religiously
neutral in implementing direct aid from the government.
III. Neutrality concerns the choices the direct aid creates or incentivizes
A third point of consideration, closely tied to avoiding coercion and endorsement, is the
extent to which a government policy affects the availability of choices or the incentives toward
religious and nonreligious choices.

In the previously mentioned example where one religious and one nonreligious school
both receive direct aid, the government not only controls but limits the marketplace of choice for
students hoping to participate in a remedial math program. The more the government limits the
marketplace of choice, the less freedom religious schools have to incorporate religious elements
when implementing the direct aid’s purpose. This is because the government must be careful to
avoid the real concern of coercing religious behavior or acts due to limited educational
alternatives. On the other hand, leaving out religious schools, or requiring them to be neutral in
implementing religious programs, can effectively coerce the choosing of nonreligious options. In
navigating these difficult decisions, the government should presume it imposes a greater
conscience violation by coercing religious choice than simply not providing a religiously
integrated option. Still, such zero-sum policy structures, where schools compete against each
other to receive direct aid, are naturally suspect as policies that may seem to favor either religion
or nonreligion; likely, they will not strike a perfect balance, nor should they be expected to.
A better—though financially more challenging—way of maintaining neutrality can be
accomplished by attempting to include all schools, or as many as possible, in direct aid
programs. When the government does this, it does not limit or bear responsibility for the variety
of choices. For instance, in the example of the government funding remedial math programs for
all schools, the government does not create the school options that exist. Instead, the government
seeks to be neutral in the incentives it creates by including all schools so that no school is
receiving a benefit incentivizing its attendance that another school is not.
Such policy structuring is ideal because it prevents a zero-sum situation; the government
does not have to choose a nonreligious school over a religious school or vice versa but rather
allows all schools to participate. Therefore, the government is less likely to be accused of

favoring one type of school. When all schools are eligible for the same benefits, and when
secular and religious schools are evaluated on the same grounds in determinations about aid, then
the government is not skewing the marketplace of choices. Certain incentives may already exist
between different schools, and the government need not attempt to correct these differences to
maintain neutrality. Rather, it must avoid creating new incentives that may seem to favor or
disfavor religious or nonreligious schools.
As previously mentioned, the availability of alternatives to religious options—or vice
versa—may determine the likelihood of coercion and establishment. The more options the
government funds with direct funding, the less likely coercion or establishment are likely to be
concerns. Of course, government funds are limited and funding all options may be difficult
practically. But to the best of its ability, the government should seek neither to intentionally
disincentivize or incentivize religious schools by its policies, and where possible, it should seek
to maximize, not minimize, the available options.
The Permissibility of Indirect Aid
The doctrine of neutrality also has implications for indirect aid, which is defined as
governmental aid that is directed to an intermediary or series of intermediaries who decide to
which school to apply the aid. Because there is an intermediary—usually a citizen—making a
choice about where the aid goes, the private choice doctrine of the Establishment Clause applies
in tandem with neutrality doctrine. Neutrality’s implications for indirect aid are similar to those
of direct aid in that the purpose of the aid must be secular and the government must be neutral
toward religion in the marketplace of choice. However, neutrality demands little of indirect aid in
terms of whether the aid is used in a religiously integrated manner. This is because the Court has

recognized as important the fact that indirect aid programs do not allow the government to
choose which schools ultimately receive aid; thus, indirect aid programs alleviate most
endorsement and coercion concerns.
I. The purpose of the aid must be secular
For the same reasons emphasized in relation to direct aid, the government’s purpose with
any indirect aid program should be secular. Secular purposes avoid policies that would constitute
government endorsement of religion.
II. The private choice doctrine makes indirect aid presumptively constitutional
The Court’s assertion in cases of private choice is that when public aid for secular
purposes reaches religious institutions through “deliberate choices of numerous individual
recipients,” the government is not establishing religion.17 The Court explicitly absolved
governmental responsibility for the aid’s final destination when it explained in Zelman that the
government’s role “ends with the disbursement of benefits.”18
This is why indirect aid programs, as long as they are secular in purpose, do not raise
coercion or establishment concerns. Coercion is mitigated by allowing individuals to make their
own choices about which schools to apply aid. Endorsement is also mitigated because the
government does not decide which institutions will receive aid. Even if private citizens choose to
apply the aid mostly to religious schools, the government does not bear responsibility for this end
result and thus cannot be said to endorse or establish religion.
III. The government must be neutral toward religion in the marketplace of choice
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Although neutrality does not demand an examination of the sum effect of private choices
in cases of indirect aid, it does demand an examination of whether the government is neutral
toward religion in the choices it provides or incentivizes. The value of private choice is hindered
when choices are constricted.
For example, if a government creates a program to provide scholarships to students that
attend private universities, students attending private religious universities should be as eligible to
receive a scholarship as students attending private nonreligious universities. Perhaps the
government may restrict the eligibility criteria to certain programs of study. Or it may exclude
pastoral training as an eligible program of study so as to avoid establishment of religion—an
exclusion the Supreme Court upheld in Locke v. Davey (2004). The government has the right to
determine its criteria for scholarship eligibility. But once it does, students at religious universities
who meet that criteria must be eligible for the publicly available benefit. If the government
excludes religious universities, it fails to meet the demands of neutrality because it expresses
disfavor toward religious options. Neutrality doctrine demands—and the private choice doctrine
supports—the inclusion of religious school options when nonreligious private schools are also
included in governmental policies.
Conclusion
Determining what forms of aid are constitutionally permissible is particularly challenging
after Espinoza. Though the Espinoza Court did not officially declare Blaine Amendments
unconstitutional in its holding, it spared no opportunity to insult their constitutionality. As state
officials and courts grapple with decisions about direct and indirect aid, they will need workable
Establishment Clause doctrines to accompany the Free Exercise Clause protection against
religious status discrimination.

Because Lemon appears to be on its way out, the Court should return to its interrelated
Establishment Clause doctrines of neutrality and private choice. Specifically, when neutrality is
considered in cases of direct aid, it is important to consider the government’s intent in providing
the aid, the possibility of coercion or endorsement imposed by providing the aid, and the
resulting marketplace of choice, including adequate existence of religious or nonreligious
alternatives, that the government creates or affects by its policy.
In cases of indirect aid, the policies should be presumed constitutional so long as the
government does not incentivize or disincentivize religious choice or constrict choices to
nonreligious options. When the Establishment Clause doctrines of neutrality and private choice
are considered in tandem with those of the Free Exercise Clause, policies that better appreciate
the “play in the joints” between the Religion Clauses will be possible.19
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